

In that letter he said that since Winston had lost confidence in him it was better for him to send in his resignation!!! I went round and saw him and advised him not to send the letter. On May 9, General Alan Brooke wrote in his diary that a Wavell aide “arrived while I was shaving with a note from Archie in which he said that had been unable to sleep and was so upset by Winston’s reference to the Burma operations that he proposed to send him a letter which he enclosed. At one point in 1943 at a Washington conference, General Archibald Wavell took umbrage at Churchill’s remarks. Generals themselves became frustrated with their civilian bosses. Historian John Connell observed: “Churchill’s sentiments about generals were ambivalent from his earliest youth onwards: he distrusted and despised them, yet he yearned to be himself a super-general, in emulation of his ancestor, Marlborough.” 4 The generals would explain why action was impossible – at least impossible without more men and more resources. “As everywhere else, nothing can be done.” 3 For Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill, dealing with generals could be frustrating. “It is exceedingly discouraging,” President Lincoln wrote. Halleck, then commanding Union troops in the Mississippi River valley. In January 1862, President Lincoln received a letter from General Henry W. Churchill and Lincoln had to make decisions based on the domestic and international political pressures they perceived as well as the military priorities they set. Moreover, he did so without according priority to laying the foundations for future Anglo-American military cooperation.” 2 Critics, however, have the advantage of hindsight. As historian Tuvia Ben-Moshe observed: “Churchill deepened his Britain’s involvement in the Middle East to a degree greater than that desired by his military advisers. Even these strategic decisions were questioned. Churchill’s “Mediterranean strategy” stressed confronting the Axis powers in North Africa before battling them in Europe. Lincoln’s strategy was characterized by the “Anaconda strategy” originated by General Winfield Scott – to surround and squeeze the Confederacy. Still, Churchill critics like historian John Connell have written: “Churchill’s strategic ideas have been amateurish, his judgment on people and events often mercurial, and his attitude towards senior commanders ambivalent but his courage and his zest in a dark time were matchless.” 1 Both leaders have not been immune from criticism about their tactical and leadership decisions. Both President Lincoln and Prime Minister Winston Churchill had a remarkable capacity to grasp the complexity of war, but even they needed to work through subordinates who did not always share their military priorities.
